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It is becoming increasingly clear that several, standard mechanisms from economics, decision 
analysis, applied mathematics, etc. don’t do what we really want them to do. Numerical schemes 
need not always find the zeros of functions; price mechanisms need not always determine an 
allocation where supply equals demand; probabilistic tools need not always yield a consistent 
decision. The basic reason is that many of these mechanisms are based upon a type of 
information which is restrictive; this means that they can’t be extended in a simple way. (See [6] 
and [7].) Moreover, even for those mechanisms which do what they are meant to do, they may 
not determine the answer fast enough to satisfy the changing needs of modern society. These are 
the type of concerns which plague the important class of mechanisms considered here; this class 
is where an ‘input-output’ relationship is given and the intent of the mechanism is to realize this 
relationship. 
Clearly, new mechanisms are required. These mechanisms need to be based on new types of 
information; different variables need to be based on new types of information; different 
variables need to be involved. But, how are they to be found? Most often new mechanisms result 
from a creative insight of an expert working in a subject area. It is a combination of experience, 
skill, and luck which allows him to discover what types of information are relevant for a certain 
task and how this information is to be used to reach the appropriate decision. In other words, the 
design of new mechanisms is, in part, an art form. 
It is this fact which both complicates and serves as a brake on progress in mechanism design. 
If the resolution depends partly upon an art form or luck, then we can expect progress to be 
uneven and slow. Also, such an approach makes it difficult to address related issues. For 
instance, is a mechanism advocated by a particular expect necessarily the only one? If not, are 
there better ones; are there undiscovered mechanisms which are optimal with respect to some 
criteria? This question becomes particularly relevant when, as in ‘expert systems’, human insight 
is being transferred to computer programs. Does such a mechanism efficiently use the capabili- 
ties peculiar to the computer, or are there better ones? 
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This question of mechanism design becomes particularly important for a new emerging area 
where experts who know how to translate theoretical ‘input-output’ relationships into practical 
approaches don’t exist. Must the implementation wait until such practical expertise is developed? 
This is the implementation issue for many of the social sciences. Here theoretical ‘input-output’ 
concepts concerning ‘fair’ distributions, etc. are developed where the ‘input’ models the current 
status of the individuals and the output may be a ‘fair’ allocation of resources. But, how can such 
concepts be implemented? What are the appropriate variables (types of information) and 
organizational designs? That is, what are the mechanisms which realize this concept? 
The resolution of these problems is to convert the search for mechanisms from an ‘art form’ 
into a ‘science’. The goal should be to convert the process of designing mechanisms into an 
algorithmatic approach. The goal should be to find an approach which (at least in theory) 
anyone with the appropriate mathematical background can use to find the mechanisms which 
realize specified objectives. In this paper; we report on the early stages of such a program to 
create a theory of ‘mechanism design’. In addition, we extend the current literature to include the 
important class of problems where the ‘input-output’ relationship is subject to constraints. (This 
turns out to be an immediate consequence of the approach discussed here. This extension was 
overlooked in the initial paper.) 
By a mechanism, we mean, first, the comn?unication structures used to extract and communi- 
cate information about the current state of the environment. An important part of this step 
involves determining what types of information are important, and what types are not. This can 
be thought of as imposing a partitioning on the environment where two items are in the same 
partition if and only if they have the same informational value with respect to the given 
input-output relationship. It is this partitioning which determines and defines the new variables. 
As part of this communication step, one must determine the organizational problem of who 
should communicate what information to whom. Next is the decision stage. This second stage 
takes the gathered information and combines it to determine the appropriate course of action, 
the resulting allocations, etc., as determined by the given relationship. 
In this paper, we concentrate on those settings where the status of the environment is 
determined by a team. A team may consist of several individuals or subgroups; each has access 
to a particular type of information and no other subgroup of this team has this information. For 
instance, in a corporation, the sales personnel know the state of the demand for a product, the 
technical personnel are aware of the production capability, and the financial people know the 
current costs. In a military setting, different subgroups are aware of what is happening in their 
sector. In an economy, each agent is aware of his or her initial endowments and preferences. So, 
in a team, this communication process has each subgroup sending information about their 
particular sector of the environment. This communication process can be thought of in the 
following manner: each subgroup can be viewed as being a separate computer-the communica- 
tion step determines what each computer must compute and what they must transmit to the 
other computers. Consequently, for a team, the communication step determines the ‘parallel 
processing’ required for the specified task. 
A mechanism has to statisfy stated objective. We model this as a ‘performance function’ P. 
This is the function which specifies for each state of the environment the appropriate course of 
action. It may be determined by an optimization approach; by theory, etc. For the example of 
the firm, P may be the production schedule which, for a given state of demand, of production 
possibilities, and of costs, leads to the maximum profit. Alternatively, P may represent the 
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schedule to maximize productivity. In an economy, P may be an equilibrium concept such as the 
Walrasian equilibrium for a profit oriented society, or an alternative Pareto concept for a 
centrally planned economy. In either case, the adopted equilibrium is determined by the agents’ 
utility functions and initial endowments. In a game or a conflict situation, P may give the 
optimal course of action as determined by the current state of the environment. Thus, P is the 
specified objective which is to be achieved. 
In summary, P is a given goal. Once P is given, the problem of mechanism design is the 
design and/or the characterization of 
(1) the communication structures, and 
(2) the decision structures which will realize P. 
The approach outlined here is based upon [4]. A brief sketch of the history of this problem can 
be found in that reference, but we point out that a dual approach to that discussed here was 
given in [2]. In [4] the emphasis was on the technical development; in this current paper the 
emphasis is on the interpretation of mechanisms and their component parts. In particular, here 
we wish to emphasize ho,w the theory determines the types of information which are relevant for 
the particular goal P. 
2. The formalism 
For modelling purposes, consider those examples where the performance function P is a 
smooth mapping 
P: D=Rklx . . . xRkh+Ra_ (2.1) 
Assume there are b > 1 agents. The ith component space of D, Rkc, models that part of the 
environment observed by the i th, and only the i th agent, i = 1,. . . , b. That is, the state of the 
environment is parameterized by vectors in the domain D, and the component space, Rkt, is a 
parameterized version of that part of the state observed by the ith agent. The range space, R”, is 
a parameterized space of actions or allocations. 
The function P defines the objective or goal of an organization. If X = (x1,. . . , xb) is the state 
in D, then the desired course of action is P(X). The goal is to design the appropriate 
organizational structures to accomplish this. 
For communication, the ith agent needs to signal, or to convey information concerning his 
observations. That is, in some codified manner, this agent must transmit information concerning 
the status of his part of the environment. For instance, in a voting problem, this status is this 
agent’s ranking of the candidates and one type of a signal is how he marks a ballot. In a standard 
price model from economics, the agent conveys the relevant information about his preferences 
and wealth in terms of his demand for goods at a given price. Consequently, these signals or 
messages are the values of the appropriate (political, economic) variables which make a process 
work. We let these messages be vectors in a Euclidean space M where M is to be determined. 
The ith agent’s communication rule is given by a smooth function gi: Rkf x M + RI. Again, 
the value of li is to be determined. The actual message is the set 
(rnEM gi(x,, m)=o). (2.4 
234 D. G. Saari / Information and design 
The type of information communicated by this agent is given by 
(x; E Rkz: g(_q, m) = 0). (2.3) 
This is the set of all of the ith agent’s environmental points which stimulate the same signal, or 
message m. For instance, if gi represents the usual price model, this set is all utility functions 
and initial endowments of the ith agent (xi) which leads to a particular demand (m) of the 
goods. In general, an interpretation of this variable depends on what P represents, on the 
structure of the the partition, and on the subject area (economics, political science, etc.) 
So, each agent communicates a set of messages. These messages represent the values of the 
types of information; more precisely, they distinguish which partition contains the current state 
of the environment. (By the implicit function theorem, often this set can be viewed as 
communicating a particular function from a given class of functions; often it is just a point.) An 
equilibrium message or signal is any m in M which agrees with the messages conveyed by all of 
the agents. These equilibrium messages are given by the intersection of all of the communicated 
sets. 
An equilibrium message contains the intelligence concerning the actual state of the environ- 
ment. Let d: M -+ R” be the decision rule. So, d(m) is the course of action, or output, 
associated with the equilibrium message m. In the voting example, it is the outcome based upon 
the tally of the ballots; in the price example, it is the allocation to each agent. 
In order for the communication and the decision rules to capture the designated objectives as 
specified by P, the following diagram must commute. 
R” 
(2.4) 
Let G=(g,,..., gb). Given P, the design problem is to characterize all triplets (G, M, d) so 
that the diagram (2.4) commutes. 
In order to eliminate redundancies, we impose a regularity assumption. 
Definition 2.1. A mechanism is said to be regular if the following three conditions are satisfied: 
(1) The number of component functions of G agrees with the dimension of M. 
(2) The Jacobian of G with respect to m has rank equal to the dimension of m. 
(3) The Jacobian of G with respect to X has maximal rank. 
As asserted, the purpose of these conditions is remove all redundancies. Essentially, the idea is 
that a regular mechanism forms a reduced set, or a ‘basis’ for the set of all mechanisms which are 
based on a certain type of information. In other words, much like one reduces a given set of 
vectors to a basis, one starts with a given mechanism and reduces it to a regular mechanism. In 
this way, we can efficiently determine the type of information which is needed to realize the 
given performance function. To find all mechanisms based on this type of information, one can 
take functional combinations of the g functions. 
In [5] these ideas and the technique described in the next section are applied to a series of 
problems from economics with and without externalities. The goal was to determine the types of 
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information, the choice of the allocation concepts (P), and the associated mechanisms. But here, 
in order to place the emphasis on the structure of ‘mechanism design’ we’ll illustrate all of this 
by use of a simple prototype example. So, let b = a = k, = k, = 2, where x1 = x = (x,, x2), 
x2 =y = (y, y2), and where 
Pb> Y> = u? p’> = ((x2 - x,b*/Lw +x2), x,/x*)* (2.5) 
One realizing mechanism for P with M = R3 would be 
&b, 4 = 
i 
x1 - m, = 0, 
x2 - m,=o, 
g2( Y, 4 = Km2 - ~,)Y*/h_Y, + m*>> - m3 = 0. 
Here, the first agent conveys the information about his status to the second agent. The second 
agent then computes the first component of P; this computed value is his signal or message. The 
final decision rule is 
Clearly, this is a regular mechanism which forces the diagram to commute. For this mecha- 
nism, the dimension of M is three; this dimension represents that three variables are being used. 
The type(s) of information, or variables used by the first agent are his total characteristics-it is 
the value of x. For the second agent, the partitioning, or type of the information used is the level 
set of P given the knowledge of the first agent’s characteristics. 
Other mechanisms can be based on the same type of information. For instance, g:( x, m) = 
A( gi( x, m)) where A is a k x 2 matrix of rank 2 is one such class. The mechanism G * = ( gl*, g2) 
is not a regular mechanism if k > 2. Likewise, the dimension of M can be increased while still 
being based on the same type of information. This is done by using a mapping K from M* to 
M where the rank of DK agrees with the dimension of M. If u is a variable in M *, then the new 
communication structures are given by gi(x, K(U)). 
Formally, each agent is communicating a set of messages to M (or M * ) where, presumably, 
some central agent, or computer, uses it via the decision function d to determine the correct 
value of P. For instance, in the above example, the formal definition has both agents communi- 
cating lines. (For the first agent, this line consists of the value of x (the value of m, and m,), 
plus all possible values of m3) But, simple and obvious modifications can alter this formal 
representation to create all sorts of different organizational designs. For instance, in the above 
example, if we assert that m, and m2 are the messages of the first agent, then the formal 
mechanism could be realized in the organizational way described above: the first agent com- 
municates the relevant point information to the second agent. Then, the first agent computes P* 
and the second agent computes P’. Thus, with this organizational design, each agent is 
communicating points, not lines. In general; once we have determined which m’s belong to 
which agent (and, usually there is flexibility in this choice), the organizational, communication 
structures are determined by what other g’s depend on this message. Additional flexibility in this 
organizational design is introduced by the choice of K: M * + M. 
Are there other regular communication and decision structures which will realize the above 
choice of P? There are. In fact, in the next section, we characterize all of the types of 
information which can be used. One type involves only a two dimensional M. Only one signal is 
needed from each person, and, for each agent, his type of information is characterized by a 
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family of straight lines. Therefore, for this new setting, the first agent need not reveal his total 
characteristics. I suggest that the reader try to determine at least one such regular mechanism 
(G, M= R2, d) p rior to reading the next section; there are an infinite number of them. 
In review, assume that (G, M, d) is a regular mechanism. 
(1) It is the level sets of g, in Rki which determine the type of information, or the new 
variables which are to be used by the ith agent (2.3). 
(2) The dimension of M determines the number of variables required. The messages, or the 
m’s are the communicated values of these variables. (2.2). The relevant information about the 
current status of the environment (the point X in 0) is represented by the equilibrium messages. 
(3) Organizational issues of “Who should communicate what to whom” are determined by the 
functional dependency of gj on i’s messages this can be considered as a communication link 
between these agents. Thus, without loss of generality, in the design of regular mechanisms, we 
can assume everything is communicated to the central agent. Decentralization and organizational 
issues can then be determined in the above, indicated manner. 
(4) All communication rules and signals can be built from some regular mechanism in an 
obvious manner. 
Thus, the regular triplet (G, M, d) is a basic step toward answering the questions raised in 
the introductory section. What remains is to find an approach which finds the regular mecha- 
nisms. 
3. The basic approach 
The following describes an approach to characterize all regular mechanisms which realize any 
given smooth performance function P of the type described in (2.1). The key point in this 
characterization can be seen in the above example. Namely, the type of information (2.3) used by 
a mechanism is given by a surface. If any two items of information are equivalent for this 
mechanism, then they lie in the same surface. These surfaces are found by fixing an equilibrium 
message and then finding the level sets of G. (By construction, this gives us all points in the 
environment which lead to the same message.) 
So, to compute all of the types of information required, we need to characterize all of the type 
of surfaces which are, in some way, compatible with the performance function P. One way to 
characterize a surface is to use its normal vectors. This is the approach we use to determine the 
information types. In doing this, it turns out that the vectors must satisfy several algebraic and 
determinant conditions; conditions which change with the choice of P and the dimension of M. 
It turns out that these conditions are most easily specified if the normal vectors are expressed in 
terms of differential forms. For instance, if D is R2 X R2, and (a,(~, y), a,(x, y), b,(x, y), 
b,(x, y)) is a smooth vector field, then this vector field is identified with the differential form 
a, dx, + u2 dx, + b, dy, + b, dy,. In particular, df is associated with the gradient of f. For 
everything which follows, interpret the one-forms as normal vectors to the surfaces defining the 
various types of information. 
Definition 3.1. The set of one forms (wi, w 2,. . . , wN) are said to define a differential ideal of 
dimension N if 
(a) TheN-formr=w,Aw,A . ..~w.#O,and 
(b) For each j, (dw,) A Y = 0. 
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We will need to take the intersection of sets of one-forms. So, if I = (wi, w2,. . . , wN), treat I 
as the vector space of one-forms generated by the indicated basis of one-forms; i.e., the set of all 
sums Caiw,. In defining this vector space, the scalar coefficients are smooth scalar functions. 
(This vector space corresponds to the vector space of normal vectors to the surfaces.) Then, the 
intersection of two sets can be viewed as the usual vector space intersection. It turns out that a 
given set of one-forms defines a differential ideal if and only if any basis of this vector space also 
defines a differential ideal. As we will see, this fact simplifies many of the resulting computa- 
tions. 
The main result characterizing the type of information and the regular mechanism follows. 
Theorem 3.1. Assume that P is given and that X is a regular point of P in D. The following form 
necessary and sufficient condition that there exists a regular mechanism (G, M, d > which realizes P 
in some neighborhood of X where the dimension of M is N. 
(a) For each j = 1,. . . , b, there are Nj one forms {w;‘} such that I, = (dP, wi,. . . , wil/, (dx),) 
defines a differential ideal. (Here (dx) _j is the set of differentials of all the coordinate functions not 
belonging or characterizing the ith agent. 
(b) Let I = flI,. Then I defines a differential ideal. The dimension of I is N = b + CN, 
The proof of this theorem is given in [4]. Although the statement of the theorem only assures 
local results, as we will see below, global solutions can result. Each of the conditious represents 
part of the modelling. Since the purpose of a mechanism is to realize P, we would expect the 
partitions of types of information to lie in the level sets of P. This is the reason dP is in each set. 
Secondly, we’ve asserted the standard privacy preserving condition where only the i th agent has 
access to certain parts of the environment. Therefore, the jth agent has no knowledge of anyone 
else’s variables. This is captured by the condition (dx) _j is in the set Ij; everyone else’s variables 
are orthogonal to his variables. The w! are unknown one-forms which can be determined. This 
will be illustrated below, but the basic idea is that the conditions in Definition 3.1 lead to 
differential equations which determine these forms. The fact that I, defines a differential ideal is 
the integrability conditions needed to ensure that the ‘normal vectors’ define the set of surfaces 
for the various types of information. The requirement that I defines a differential ideal ensures 
there is the proper coordination among the variables from the various agents (with respect to the 
specified task P). 
To illustrate this theorem, return to the example from the last section. Condition a of the 
above theorem requires that I, 3 (d P’, d P*, d y,, d y2). To determine whether this defines a 
differential ideal, we can use any basis of the vector space defined by these four one-forms. In 
particular, both (aP/ay,) d yj, j = 1, 2 are in this vector space, so dP’ can be replaced with 
d P,’ = ( aP’/axl) dx, + (aP’/ax,) dx,. The four-form r resulting from the wedge product of 
these four one-forms is zero. This indicates that they don’t form an independent basis. Indeed, 
simple computations show that a basis is given by (dP2, d y,, d y2) and that it defines a 
differential ideal. Similarly, I, can be reduced to (dP,’ = (aP’/ay,) dy, + (aP’/ay,) dy,, dx,, 
dx,). Let w = xlyl d y, + x2 d y,. Then w is a scalar functional multiple of d Pi. So, I, = 
(w, dx, dx,). Again, I2 defines a differential ideal. 
The intersection of I1 and I, is I = (d P2x, w). A simple computation shows that this set 
defines a differential ideal. Thus, there does exist a mechanism which realizes P where M has 
dimension 2. 
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The next task is to find the mechanism, and, in particular, to characterize the type of 
information which is involved. In what follows, note the similarities of this process to that used 
in the solution of ordinary differential equations when integrating factors are found to convert a 
differential equation into an exact differential equation. Both processes are closely related. 
To see how to find the mechanism, note that the above theorem asserts there are functions 
gi( X, m) and g2( y, m) whose level sets define the information type. That is, the gradient of gi 
(holding m fixed as a parameter) must be orthogonal to this level set. This means that dg, is in 
1,. In other words, dg, is a scalar function multiple of dP*, and dg, is a scalar functional 
multiple of w. Since dg, doesn’t depend upon x, such a scalar multiple can be found. (Divide w 
by xi. This gives a term x2/x1. To eliminate the dependency on the x’s, this ratio must be a 
message of the first agent. That it is follows from the fact that its differential is in Ii.) Then, the 
resulting partial differential equations for dgi can be solved to obtain, say, 
g,(x, m) = xlml + x2m2 = 0, g2LL 4 =Ylm*+Y,-ml =o. 
(Actually, the differential equations for the gi functions admit an infinite number of solutions. 
This is because any such choice determines one particular choice of basis for the normal vectors 
to the surface. Still, the zero set, or the type of information, remains the same.) 
Even though the theorem asserts the existence of a local mechanism, we found a global one. 
This is just a tacit use of standard continuation procedures to determine the maximal domain of 
definition as in differential equations. (Existence theorems assert local existence but global 
solutions result by continuation methods.) However, a word of caution is appropriate at this 
point. The ‘maximal’ domain of definition applies to the type of information; it doesn’t 
necessarily apply to the corresponding communication rule g,. The problem is similar to that of 
trying to represent a globe with a two dimensional map; geometric restrictions force us to use 
more than one map. Similar mathematical obstructions lead to the interesting possibility that 
more than one communication rule is needed to capture the same information type, or partition, 
in differing parts of the environment. As a last point, note that although we required X to be a 
regular point for P, the resulting mechanism holds even for singular points. 
The remaining issue is to see how, in a different type of a problem, to determine the unknowns 
w in the ideas I. To see how to do this, suppose we want a mechanism for the above P where the 
dimension of M is 3 and where N = 1. To do this, define w* = a,(~, y) dx, + a,(~, y) dx, 
where the a’s are to be determined, and let w * be in 1,. For 1, to define a differential ideal, the 
a’s need only satisfy the condition that the vector (a,, a2) is linearly independent of the vector 
associated with d P*. (This comes from part a of Definition 3.1. Part (b) is satisfied automatically 
by dimension considerations as it leads to a five-form over a four space.) Then, I will consist of 
dP,r, dP*, and w*. For I to define a differential ideal, the a’s must satisfy the partial 
differential equation resulting from dw * A (w * A d P,? A d P2) = 0. From this partial differential 
equation, a choice of the a’s can be found. (Conversely, if such a’s don’t exist, then a regular 
mechanism of this type doesn’t exist. Thus, the existence of mechanisms can be determined by 
existence and non-existence theorems from partial differential equations.) The resulting g’s are 
determined in a fashion similar to the above. (A simple solution of all of this results by noting 
that if part (a) of Definition 3.1 is satisfied for I,; then a basis is given by (dx,, dx2, dy,, dy,). 
The rest of the computations are trivial, and it shows that the mechanism and the type of 
information given at the end of Section 2 characterizes this case.) 
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In much the sa,me way, all of the information types, or variables can be determined for this 
choice of P. There are four of them: 
(1) Complete revelation. The partitions are points given by the values of x and y. 
(2) The type of information given in Section 2; the partitions are points for the first agent and 
level sets of P’ given the value of x. 
(3) The second agent’s partitions are points concerning the value of y; the first agent’s sets are 
lines corresponding to the level set of P. 
(4) Both agent’s partions are given by lines. The partitions are the ones derived above. 
Although there are only four different types of information, there are an uncountable number 
of mechanisms employing this type of information. Any smooth mechanism which realizes P is 
based on one of these four types of information. 
4. Constraints 
For many problems, the natural setting involves constraints. These may be constraints on the 
type of messages or signals each agent can send. Most of the incentive literature from economics 
and political science can be viewed in this way. Here we want to find message systems where it is 
in the best interest of each agent to communicate the values of the variables honestly; we want 
them to tell the truth concerning what they observe in the environment. For instance in the 
example we’ve been using, if P2 denotes the amount of money the first agents is to receive, then 
there is nothing in the mechanisms we’ve described which would make it in this agent’s best 
interest to tell the truth. Namely, if these are characteristics known only to him, then he can 
safely misrepresent his actual status and reap a benefit. (‘Incentives’ has an extensive but recent 
history. Two survey papers might be [3] and [l]. It turns out that these constraints impose 
conditions on the ways in which mechanisms are can be constructed out of a regular mechanism; 
that is, they impose conditions on the choice of functions such as K: M * + M, and the 
functional combinations of the g’s. 
A second type of constraint is imposed on the domain of P. For example, in a given economy, 
it may be known that there is only a fixed amount of each commodity, and that it is shared 
among all of the agents. Another natural constraint of this type is ‘individual rationality’; no 
person will trade to a situation which is worse than the current one. These constraints change the 
performance function. In this paper, we concentrate on this last type of constraint. In a future 
paper, we characterize the first type of constraint where the emphasis will be on problems such 
as ‘incentives’. 
A constraint reduces the dimension of the domain for P. A straightforward way to handle this 
problem is to use implicit function techniques to solve for the constraints and re-express P in 
terms of the new, reduced variables. However, this can be a messy, difficult, analytic task. 
Moreover,. such analytic manipulations tend to obscure important qualitative questions. For 
instance, how does a particular constraint affect the type of information and the resulting 
mechanisms, and how are they related to the original mechanism? 
We need a simple theory which incorporates constraints. Toward this end, let 
C: D+R” (4-U 
be a smooth function which models our constraints. There are two different classes. The first is 
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where the constraint is given by C-‘(O). That is, the domains is restricted to a particular level set 
of C. The second is where the domain is restricted to some level set of C. To see the distinction, 
consider a trading society where there is a fixed amount of each type of goods. The first type of 
constraint is where the total amount of each good is known (at least to the designer of the 
system). Thus, the constraint states that the sum of all that is held by the agents must equal this 
total. The second type corresponds to where the total amount isn’t known; thus the total equals 
some value, but this value isn’t prior knowledge to anyone. The interest in the second type of 
constraint is to determine those natural types of information and mechanisms which involve 
these constraints. After all, if the constraints are ‘natural’ to the problem, then we might expect 
some of the variables to respect these constraints. The next theorem characterizes the second 
case. 
Theorem 4.1. Let X be a regular point for ( P, C): D + R” X R’. The following are necessary and 
sufficient conditions that a regular mechanism exists in some neighborhood of X which realizes P, 
where the type of information lies in level sets of C, and where the dimension of M is N. 
(1) For each i, there exist a set of one-forms wZ so that theset Ii = (dP, dC, wi, . . . , w,, (dx)_,) 
defines a differential ideal. 
(2) The vector space of one-forms I = flI, defines a differential ideal, and it is spanned by a basis 
of N one-forms. 
The next statement characterizes the fixed constraint state. 
Theorem 4.2. Let X be a regular point of P. Assume given the constraint C(X) = 0 where C is a 
smooth function from D to R and the rank of DC remains fixed at value k in some neighborhood of X 
on the constraint set. Then, the following are necessary and sufficient conditions that there exists a 
regular mechanism in some neighborhood of X which realizes P, where M has dimension N, and 
where the types of information are on the constraint set. 
(1) From the relationship dC = 0, solve for k of the differential form representing coordinate 
functions. 
(2) For each i, there is a set of one-forms { wi} so that the set Ii = (dP, wi,. . . , w,, (dx)_i) 
defines a differential ideal. In these sets, each one-form is reduced by the relationships C = 0 and the 
k relationships obtained in 1. 
(3) The vector space I = nI, defines a differential ideal, and it has a basis of N one-forms. 
As asserted in the introductory section; these results are immediate consequences of the 
theorem in Section 3. For the first theorem we want the variables, or the partitions of 
information, to lie in the constraint level sets. This is equivalent to finding the information sets 
for the ‘performance’ function (P, C), with the one exception that the decision function need 
not determine the value of C. But this is the statement of the theorem as modified in Theorem 
4.1. 
The above constructions are based upon the Frobenius theorem from differential geometry. 
They hold whether the space is an Euclidean space, or a manifold. The conditions in the second 
stated theorem correspond to where there is a manifold. 
Examples. With our standard example, consider the constraint x1 yr + x2 = c. (This is the 
denominator of P’.) That is, assume that the structure of the problem is such that we want to 
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find new types of information which lie on these level sets. This modifies the sets I, and I2 
found in Section 3 in the following way. 
I1 = (dP2 = x, dx, - x2 dxi, dC =y, dx, + xi dy, + dx2, dy,, dy,) 
= (dx,, dx2, dy,, dy,) 
1, = (w, dC, dxi, dx,) = (dx,, dx,, dy,, dy,). 
The information types or variables are the points x and y. In other words, if we ask for types 
of information which satisfy certain constraints, no matter how ‘natural’ they may seem, it may 
turn out they impose harsher restrictions on the types of information. This is what happens here; 
the only type of information of P which satisfies the constraint are the values of the points. 
Now suppose that xiyi + x2 = 2. In this case the problem is has a specific constraint. Solving 
for dx2, we get dx, = -(xi dy, +yi dx,). The sets I, now become 
Ii = (dP2, dy,, dy,) = (after substituting for dx,) 
= (x2 dx, + xi(y, dx, + xi dy,)> dy,> dy,) = (2dx,> dy,, dy,). 
J2= (w, dxi, dx,= -(xi dy, +Y, dx,)) 
= (dy,, dy,, dx,). 
Here, the types of information are the value of xi and that of y. The interesting point to note 
is that although the domain of the problem is reduced in dimension (from 4 to 3) the minimal 
number of types of information is increased (from 2 to 3). The opposite direction can also be 
true-by increasing the dimension of the domain and appropriately redefining P, we may be 
able to simplify the information types. This, of course, leads to an intriguing possibility that the 
standard problems from economics, political science, ‘and elsewhere may admit simplier (or, at 
least fewer) types of information should the dimension of the domain be increased and should P 
be defined in an appropriate manner. 
What happened above is that the reducing constraint didn’t share the same separability 
properties as P. As a result, the ‘reduced’ problem lost its separability; consequently, the number 
of types of information increased. The number of types of information can be reduced should the 
constraint be ‘consistent’ with the separability properties. To see this, consider the constraint 
x2 = ax, where a is a given constant. Solving for dx, yields dx, = a dx,. The resulting sets I, 
are 
Ii = (dP2> dy,, dy,) = ((xi - 2x2) dx2, dy,, dy,) = (dy,, dy,), 
I2 = (w, dq) = ( -ylxl dy + (qy + q) dy,, dx) 
= ( -Y, dy2 + (Y, + a> dy,, dxl, dx,). 
It turns out that Ii, I2 and I define differential ideals where I2 = ( -y2 dy, + (yl + a) dy,) 
has dimension 1. Solving for the only message which is neccessary we have m = y2/( y1 + a). The 
decision function is 
d(m) = m(a - 1)“. 
That is, if the constraint is compatible with the separability properties of the performance 
function P, we have a reduction in the types of information from 2 to 1. This is true in general. 
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Finally, turn to a related problem where a family of constraints are given, and one must 
determine whether it is ‘advantageous’ to use any of them. The above technique isolates them. To 
see this, consider the following family of constraints where c is a parameter: 
(1 - c(l +yl))xl +x2 = 2c. 
When c = 1, we have the first type of constraint; when c = 0, we have the second type of 
constraint. The above type of analysis can be used to determine that only c = 0 is compatible 
with the separability properties of P. 
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